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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement on multina-
tionalschoice of input suppliers and industry prots in a host economy. The framework consists
of suppliers with heterogeneous capabilities who must engage in a relation-specic investment
to customize intermediate inputs upon a transfer payment by nal producers. An outsourcing
contract with better technologically-endowed suppliers requires a lower transfer and generates a
higher surplus. Stronger IPR enforcement leads rms to self-select into better quality suppliers
on average by reducing their outside option. Weak legal institutions instead make it possible
for a larger range of suppliers, including the less capable ones, to form partnerships by granting
them a larger outside option. A better IPR environment is more likely to harm lagging countries
where the technology distribution is characterized by less capable suppliers.
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1 Introduction
The organization of production and innovation in global supply chains has been subject to recent
intense research among trade economists.1 The complex contractual relationships between the up-
stream and downstream rms in international markets have particularly been under the spotlight in
studying the organizational decisions of rms, relation-specic investments, and consequences for the
economy. A good example used to study supply arrangements has been the Keiretsu models in the
Japanese industries, where suppliers undertake relation-specic investments directed at customizing
a product to make it more valuable to a particular partner, but not to other potential (rival) buyers.
Applications of the Keiretsu models have been brought into the ambit of international trade by Qiu
and Spencer (2001,2002). This type of relationship between assemblers and suppliers is especially
prevalent in the Japanese automotive sector (Ahmadijan and Oxley, 2006, 2013).
This paper constitutes one of the rst attempts to introduce supplier heterogeneity into a model
of global sourcing, a step deemed necessary both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective
in the literature of rm organization (Antràs, 2014). Indeed, the business and economic literature
has to a great extent treated rst-tier suppliers as being similar in nature. A closer look within
industries, however, reveals a di¤erent reality, and more so after the 21st century trends towards
the globalization of outsourcing strategies. Suppliers are heterogeneous in several respects. An
immediate rst feature that distinguishes suppliers from one another is their prototyping facilities
and R&D capabilities in customizing components to meet the standards required by their customers.2
Superior knowledge and technology make some suppliers more attractive and of higher competitive
signicance to manufacturers in the global market. However, they could also pose a bigger threat
under a weak intellectual property rights (IPR) environment. Linkages with multinational enterprises
can also have consequences for the domestic economy as a whole by a¤ecting competition and the
quality of the supply chain, which in turn depends on the rms choice of suppliers.
Yet, how do multinationals decide their global sourcing strategy and select suppliers for the pro-
curement of their relation-specic inputs? Do they always rely on the best few rst-tier suppliers
in each country or do they behave di¤erently in di¤erent environments when choosing their sub-
contractor? This research aims to provide a theory in order to explain the patterns of outsourcing
relationships between multinational rms and suppliers. Suppliers are heterogeneous in terms of
their technological capability in host countries that are characterized by their legal institutions. By
introducing supplier heterogeneity in the upstream market, we can investigate the decisions of rms
in the formation of outsourcing contracts with assorted suppliers. We emphasize di¤erences (or
improvements) in institutional quality to explore how IPR enforcement may inuence the supplier
1See Helpman (2006) for a thorough overview.
2See Kamath and Liker (1994) for a more detailed explanation regarding the Japanese and American automotive
industry based on a survey of auto-part suppliers to Toyota, Nissan, Mazda, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler.
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mix and examine the e¤ect of supplier choice on the domestic economy.
More specically, nal producers source to a continuum of suppliers that are heterogeneous with
respect to their ability in undertaking relation-specic investments. Suppliers must commit to make
an investment that can be interpreted as a customization (or R&D) cost, the extent of which depends
on their ability to carry out the relation-specic task. Less technologically-endowed suppliers are
required to make a larger investment to satisfy the multinationals needs. After nding a partner,
nal producers are bound to make a payment to their supplier to cover a part of the necessary
investment, in order to minimize hold-up problems in the upstream-downstream relationship. The
more technologically capable the suppliers are, the lower that the required payment is. Consequently,
a higher joint surplus is generated within the relationship.
The framework adds a further important feature often overlooked in the literature when assessing
multinationalslinks with the most capable suppliers: the outside option of suppliers in outsourcing
relationships.3 By adding supplier heterogeneity, we are able to identify suppliers who di¤er in their
outside options according to their customization or R&D capability. Multinationals on average tend
to outsource to suppliers with better R&D capabilities in countries with stronger IPR institutions.
IPR enforcement ensures adequate relation-specic investment by lowering the suppliers outside
option and hence the probability of defection. By contrast, when the IPR environment is weak,
supplier technology plays a less important role and buyer-supplier relations are also formed with less
capable suppliers. This is because weak legal institutions provide them with an outside option that
increases their chances of survival in the market.
Introducing heterogeneity among suppliers also allows us to make predictions regarding the conse-
quences of IPR enforcement for the host economies. The results suggest that the impact of increasing
R&D e¢ ciency in the intermediate sector by creating a more stringent IPR environment in the home
economy is ambiguous. An enhancement in the average technology of rivals in the economy lowers
average prots and makes it harder for less capable suppliers to survive in the market. On the one
hand, less competition increases the protability of the most technologically capable suppliers in the
intensive margin. On the other hand, a reduced number of active suppliers lowers the number of
rms and hence aggregate prots on the extensive margin. The e¤ect of IPR enforcement is more
likely to be negative for technologically lagging host countries with a fat right tail distribution of
suppliers with inferior technologies. A shrinking upstream sector serving foreign producers caused
by better quality IPR institutions can in this case be harmful to the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and
evidence. Sections 3 and 4 introduce the basics of the model. Section 5 solves the equilibrium and
presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
3The few previous works that have touched upon the issue include Andrabi, Ghatak and Khwaja (2006), Lin and
Saggi (2007) and Assche and Schwartz (2010).
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2 Related Literature and Evidence
The organization of rms was rst incorporated into trade theory by McLaren (2000) and Grossman
and Helpman (2002). These papers also studied the degree to which suppliers decide to customize
intermediate products to the needs of their intended buyer. This is the emphasis of Grossman and
Helpman (2003), who use the transaction cost approach to nd that better contract enforcement
increases the fraction of rms that engage in outsourcing.4 Grossman and Helpman (2005), however,
show that in a general equilibrium setting an improvement in the contractual environment in the
South can raise or lower the volume of outsourcing there. Antràs and Helpman (2008) turn the
page to the property-right theory to show that improvements in the contractibility of components
provided by suppliers in the South increases the relative prevalence of FDI over outsourcing.
As for the e¤ect of contract enforcement on the economy, another branch of the literature uses a
measure of contract dependence to show that countries with well-functioning contractual institutions
will be net exporters of contract-intensive goods. Acemoglu et al. (2007) show that greater con-
tractual incompleteness leads to the adoption of less-advanced technologies with a more pronounced
e¤ect when there is greater complementarity among intermediate inputs. Costinot (2009) derives
the result that countries with better contracting institutions have a comparative advantage in more
complex sectors. Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) suggest measures of contract dependence re-
lated to the costs of contracting between upstream and downstream producers and provide empirical
evidence that a countrys comparative advantage is partly determined by contracting institutions.
Despite the vast literature on outsourcing and incomplete contracts, the role of IPR enforce-
ment in the outsourcing decision of multinationals remains to a large extent unexplored in eco-
nomic literature. On this regard, Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) emphasize the e¤ects of the
non-appropriable nature of knowledge on the organizational decision of rms, suggesting that past
literature has concentrated too much on hold-up ine¢ ciencies as the main drivers of outsourcing
decisions. As for evidence on multinational activities, Branstetter, et al. (2006) show that tech-
nology transfer by US multinationals to their a¢ liates increase after IPR reforms. Ivus (2010)
nds that increasing IPRs in developing countries raises the value of developed countriesexports in
patent-sensitive industries. Canals and S¸ener (2014) show that US rms substantially expand their
intra-industry o¤shoring activities in high technology industries as a response to IPR reforms in the
host countries. Naghavi, et al. (2014) further show that technology-sharing outsourcing of more
sophisticated goods by French multinationals take place in countries with better IPR enforcement.
Despite clear evidence on technology transfer, however, controversies on the appropriateness of IPR
protection in the developing and emerging world persist. Lai and Qiu (2003) debate the suitability
of Norths IPR standards for the South, whereas Chu, et al. (2014) argue the relevance of the stage
of development for the protection of IPRs.
4See Defever and Toubal (2013) among others for evidence that supports this hypothesis.
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In this paper, we focus on the impact of the quality of IPR institutions on industry prots in the
supply chain in the destination country. In particular, we follow Grossman and Helpman (2005) to
explore the location decision of rms that have already decided to engage in international outsourcing
and its impact on the supplier market and subsequently the host economy. Opening an economy
translates into more intensive competition, limiting the number of local suppliers that can serve
the multinationalsneeds. As a result, only the most qualied suppliers enjoy technology transfer
through the outsourcing partnership because multinationals tend to focus their supplier development
e¤orts on their key (most technologically capable) suppliers.5 Globalization has therefore weakened
the position of less e¢ cient suppliers in host developing economies and made it more di¢ cult for
them to survive. We argue that the quality of IPR enforcing institutions in a host country decides
the magnitude of this e¤ect.
The lack of rm-level data on suppliers and the choice of multinationals between suppliers of
di¤erent capabilities makes it di¢ cult to carry out an empirical investigation of our theoretical
prediction. The closest attempt has been a comprehensive survey of Japanese rms performed by
the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) through The Survey of Corporate
O¤shore Activities on large rms (above 50 employees) conducted in 2006 across all manufacturing
industries in Japan. A very novel and valuable feature of this survey is the disaggregation of o¤shore
outsourcing activities by geographical destinations and information on the factors that inuence their
location choice. In addition, rms are asked to communicate their perception of the enforcement
of intellectual property rights for each country when making their choice. Ito, Eiichi and Wakasugi
(2007) for instance show that the perception of enforcement in China has a score of 2.3 (out of 5),
while the corresponding scores for the US and Europe are 4.4 and 3.8, respectively. Given the results
of our model we expect outsourcing rms to go to more productive rms in the US and Europe,
while this is less the case when outsourcing to China. Indeed, the results of the survey exhibited
in Ito, Eiichi and Wakasugi (2007) show that 16% of rms that have started to engage in o¤shore
outsourcing in the last 5 years to China list suppliers high technology levels or superior human
capital quality as a factor inuencing their location choice, while 28% of rms do so for the US
and Europe. The region Other Asia lies between the two, with 18% listing the above characteristic
of suppliers as the factor that attracted them and an enforcement score of 2.8. The gures are
in line with our nding that rms that engage in international outsourcing tend to go to more
technologically capable suppliers on average, in countries with strong IPR enforcement.
5Although we only study the case of international outsourcing, it is important to keep in mind that foreign rms
tend to be in a di¤erent position from local rms: they come from a world market where rms enjoy established
suppliers aware of their technical/quality needs. As a result, it would only be worthwhile for multinationals to go to
the best available suppliers.
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3 The Model with Heterogeneous Suppliers
The economy consists of two countries, North and South. We focus on an industry that produces an
endogenous number of di¤erentiated consumer goods. The goods are designed and assembled in the
North, whereas the production of the required intermediate goods is outsourced to the South. The
goods specically target consumers in the North. The South therefore plays the role of a production
site. We can think of a reduced form explanation, where nal producers are multinationals and
outsource the production of their intermediates to a host country. We are interested in studying
the interaction between multinational rms and input suppliers, and the impact of outsourcing to
heterogeneous suppliers on the host economy given that the outsourcing decision has already taken
place for motives such as lower wages or the higher e¢ ciency of intermediate specialists.
We assume that the only factor needed for the production of the intermediate good is labor.
Production of the nal good in turn uses these inputs, in such a way that one unit of the intermediate
good is required to produce one unit of the nal good. Moreover, because of the di¤erentiated nature
of nal goods, suppliers must customize their intermediate good perfectly so that it can only be used
by that particular producer. Customization costs in our model take into account the explicit form of
learning costs that an input supplier has to incur to acquire the necessary technology, management
and marketing techniques to compete in the world market. The nal producer can provide support
for part of the training and technology transfer costs through a payment to partially reimburse the
investment.
The amount of the transfer depends on the technological capability of the supplier. We assume
suppliers to be heterogeneous in terms of xed customization/R&D costs, but all face the same
marginal costs once they start producing. The proposed formulation implies that some suppliers
adapt faster than others to nal producersrequirements and hence need less external support to
achieve the targeted customization. The more technologically-endowed that the supplier is prior to
the partnership, the lower that the required payment to guarantee the desired quality of standards
is. More capable suppliers therefore yield a higher surplus, which makes them a more attractive
target.
The framework presented below is a variant of Grossman and Helpman (2003, 2005). The novelty
of our model lies in the heterogeneous nature of suppliers in the targeted country. Heterogeneity
makes it possible for nal producers to rank suppliers according to their technology. This generates
a sorting of suppliers according to their technology, and the division between subcontractors who
do and do not serve multinationals. It will be seen that the R&D capability also gives suppliers a
larger outside option, which is in turn inuenced by the IPR enforcement environment.
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3.1 Consumers
The consumption of the nal good takes place in the North. Households share the same preferences
with their utility dened over the consumption of a horizontally di¤erentiated good C, where
C =
Z n
0
cj dj
 1

(1)
is a CES quantity index in which cj is the consumption of variety j, n is the number of varieties
produced, and  is an inverse measure of the degree of product di¤erentiation between varieties.
Households maximize consumption subject to the following constraint
E = wLN =
Z n
o
pjcjdj (2)
where pj is the price of variety j, and the expenditure consumers incur on output from the industry,
E, equals aggregate income, wLN , with LN representing total labor used in the industry under the
common assumption of an innite supply of labor at an exogenously set market wage rate, w > 1.
The utility maximizing prot results in the demand for the jthvariety of the form
cj = Ap
 
j (3)
where A is the aggregate demand associated with the quantity index C and is dened as
A =
ER n
0
p1 j dj
; (4)
and  is the elasticity of substitution.
3.2 Firms
Upon payment of an entry xed cost, fe, intermediate suppliers draw a technology level  from a
distribution g() with a continuous cumulative distribution G() 2 [0; 1] where G(0) = 0, G(1) = 1.
With  as a threshold capability above which suppliers nd it protable to enter, 1 G() represents
the range of existing suppliers in the market. The parameter  can also be interpreted as the rms
marginal capacity of technology absorption. It determines a cost in terms of the level of labor e¤ort
they have to make in order to adapt to the technological needs of the representative nal producer.
Once (potential) suppliers learn their customization capabilities, they go to the market where they
negotiate contracts with nal rms. They must pay a xed cost ks in terms of Southern labor to
start producing, where the market wage in the host country is normalized to one. Whenever a
partnership is successful, production starts. Once in business, all suppliers need one unit of labor to
produce one unit of the intermediate good, irrespective of .
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Final rms in turn engage in production upon payment of a xed cost wkf in terms of Northern
labor. They then look for a supplier and upon success propose their desired prototype, and begin
the two-step negotiation. In general, they will have to incur costs that relate to a customization
payment or know-how transfer. We will see that this required payment will decrease in . Final
rms that have managed to form a successful partnership compete in a typical Dixit-Stiglitz manner:
each pair of rms is a monopolist in the production of a di¤erentiated good. They pay a xed cost
each period and use the intermediate good to produce and market their variety. Thus we assume
that nal producers have no variable costs and can therefore consider them to be homogeneous in
terms of productivity for the purposes of this paper.
4 Contracts
Any active rm in this economy is part of a partnership composed of a supplier of customized
intermediate inputs and a nal producer in charge of the assembly, marketing and distribution of
(di¤erentiated) nal goods. Prior to commencing production, rms meet in pairs and negotiate
the terms of their future relations. Any supplier is a priori capable of customizing inputs to any
formulation required. Moreover, even though nal producers manufacture di¤erentiated goods, the
cost of building the right prototype is the same for all goods.
The negotiation takes place after the two parties meet under the assumption that pairs are always
formed (no search frictions). Following Grossman and Helpman (2005), such a negotiation can be
thought of as being composed of two stages. Assume that the nal producer owns all the know-how
about its particular product. In the rst stage, it transmits the information about the exact type of
intermediate input it requires to the (prospective) supplier. We may call this stage the investment
contract, where we make explicit that the supplier needs to incur an investment cost in order to
close a deal. This contract commits the supplier to undertake the investment in customization so
that an acceptable prototype is created. The contract stipulates a payment to which the supplier is
entitled if the prototype is satisfactorily developed.
Once the supplier has undertaken the required investment to manufacture the required prototype,
the two parties move on to the second stage of the negotiations. The two rms write an order contract
through which they stipulate the quantities that the nal producer will demand and the associated
price. Incentives are fully aligned at this stage as both rms have sunk investments, and the only
plausible source of income available to them is the joint surplus that arises from their relationship.
Thus, the order contract will be the joint prot maximizing one and the quantity stipulated will
be the quantity of inputs needed to produce the demand for nal goods in the market. In turn,
the price of the intermediate good will be at its lowest possible level, i.e., the marginal cost of the
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supplier.6
4.1 The Order Contract
The order contract determines the surplus arising from a successful partnership. As discussed before,
the optimum strategy at this stage is to maximize joint variable prots (revenue), since all xed costs
are already sunk. Recall that rms are monopolists in the production of their own jth variety, and so
they pick the optimum price facing a downward-sloping demand curve derived from the consumers
maximization problem. We further denote the prot share that accrues to the supplier and the nal
producer by [1  !] and !, respectively.
The jth partnership maximizes
Rj = f + s = pjyj   xj (5)
where yj = cj is the demand and xj is the quantity of the intermediate good. This is divided
according to the bargaining power of each side so that a share [1  !] goes to the nal producer:
f = [1  !](pfyj   xj); (6)
and ! goes to the intermediate supplier:
s = !(pfyj   xj): (7)
By the assumption that one unit of intermediate goods is required to produce one unit of nal goods
and with iceberg costs on intermediate goods  > 1, we have yj =
xj
 . Thus, we may rewrite
Rj = pj
xj

  xj = (pj

  1)xj = Ap j (
pj

  1) (8)
The rst-order condition yields pj =   1 , and hence a price
pj = 

   1 =


; (9)
where 1 =

 1 is the mark-up over marginal cost resulting from the monopoly position of a rm in
the production of its specic variety. As usual, this mark-up is inversely related to the elasticity of
substitution: @1=@ < 0, that is, it is positively related to the degree of product di¤erentiation. The
more that the pair of goods are substitutes, the less the market power that each rm has and thus
the lower the price that it charges.
The quantity e¤ectively demanded of each good j equals cj = Ap
 
j = A
 


 
, which is equal
to the demand for the intermediate good. Total revenue is therefore
Rj = (1  )A
 

1 
: (10)
6 It will never be optimal for the supplier to charge a higher price, since that would result in a higher marginal cost
for the nal producer, and a higher-than-optimal price which entails lower joint prots.
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The operating prots of a nal rm and its input suppliers are
f = [1  !] (1  )A
 

1 
(11)
and
s = ! (1  )A
 

1 
(12)
Using (9), we redene aggregate demand as
A =
E
n
 


1  ; (13)
where the number of varieties n also represents the number of paired suppliers and nal producers.
Using (13) in (11) and (12), we can rewrite the operating prot of each type of rm in its nal form
f = [1  !] (1  ) E
n
(14)
and
s = ! (1  ) E
n
: (15)
Note that the trade costs disappear as a higher price is o¤set by a lower demand for the nal good.
4.2 The Investment Contract
The investment required for the relation-specic asset, I(), varies across suppliers andis a decreasing
function of  such that suppliers that draw a better technology need to devote less e¤ort in terms
of labor to create the required prototype, i.e. @I()@ < 0. The supplier also has the outside option
of using the know-how provided by nal producers for its own benet by serving the local market,
denoted by O (; ). This implies that similar to nal producers, suppliers can convert their inputs
into nal outputs at a cost that depends on their capability and sell in the domestic economy.7
Better suppliers face a larger outside option, i.e., @O(;)@ > 0. Yet, the opportunities from defecting
are decreasing in terms of the e¤ectiveness of the IPR environment, i.e., @O(;)@ < 0. Finally, the
nal rm needs to give incentives to the supplier and does so by promising an up-front payment
T (; ) towards the completion of the investment. The prots of the supplier can be written as
s = s    (; ) + T (; ); (16)
where we dene  (; ) = I() O (; ). The nal rms operating prots are in turn
f = f   T (; ): (17)
7Suppliers would have a hard time selling these goods in the world market (here in the North) if they do not abide
by the contract (Antràs, 2014).
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The payment comes out of a Nash generalized bargaining process, through which both parts maxi-
mize joint prots by anticipating their share of those prots.
By substituting (15) into (16), the surplus for the supplier (net of costs already sunk) is
s = !
E
n
(1  )   (; ) + T (; ) (18)
and the surplus for the producer is found by substituting (14) into (17) to obtain
f = [1  !]E
n
(1  )  T (; ) (19)
To derive the payment, the Nash product is maximized with respect to T (; )
Max
T (;)
 =

[1  !]E
n
(1  )  T (; )
1 ! 
!
E
n
(1  )   (; ) + T (; )
!
;
where  (; ) implicitly contains the outside option of the supplier. By log-linearizing  we can
rewrite
Max
T (;)
ln = [1  !] ln

[1  !]E
n
(1  )  T (; )

+ ! ln

!
E
n
(1  )   (; ) + T (; )

with the FOC
@ ln
@T
=   1  !
[1  !]En (1  )  T (; )
+
!
!En (1  )   (; ) + T (; )
= 0:
This gives us an expression for T (; ), which in turn depends on ! and  (; ):
T (; ) = [1  !] (; ) or 1  ! = T (; )
 (; )
: (20)
Lemma 1 The transfer payment required by a subcontractor that satises the Nash bargaining out-
come T (; ) is lower for more capable suppliers because (i) they need less support as their investment
costs to customize are lower, and (ii) they invest less within the contract as they enjoy a larger outside
option.
Proof. This follows directly from the Nash bargaining solution (20) together with the denition
of  (; ) being an integrated term which is a function of the supplierstechnological capability and
their outside option.
After replacing T (; ) in (18) and (19) from (20) we can rewrite the prots functions of each
type of rm
s =
(1  )!E
n
   (; ) + [1  !] (; ) = !

E
n
(1  )   (; )

(21)
f =
(1  ) [1  !]E
n
  [1  !] (; ) = [1  !]

E
n
(1  )   (; )

(22)
for the supplier and the nal rm, respectively.
11
5 Equilibrium
5.1 Supplier Zero Cut-O¤Conditions
Suppliers enter into outsourcing relations after paying the production xed cost, ks, with the expected
gains of a supplier with technology  from a partnership being s   ks.
Using (21), the zero cut-o¤ condition for the supplier implies that
ks = s = s    (; ) + T (; ) = !

E
n
(1  )  (; )

(23)
The cut-o¤ investment needed, above which a supplier cannot serve the multinational, is
(; ) =
E
n
(1  )  ks
!
; (24)
where  is the cut-o¤ value of , such that any supplier with  <  is required to make an
investment it cannot a¤ord.8 Note that the cut-o¤ investment level below which suppliers nd it
protable to enter into a relationship is increasing in !, which implies that a larger ! tends to create
a more favorable condition for suppliers to enter relationship-specic contracts.
The nal good producer who enters a partnership with the threshold supplier earns
wkf = f = f   T (; ) = [1  !]

E
n
(1  )  (; )

; (25)
where prots are equal to wkf to satisfy the zero prot condition. By substituting the investment
costs of the threshold supplier from (24) into (25) we obtain
wkf
ks
=
1  !
!
=) ! = ks
wkf + ks
: (26)
Lemma 2 The prot share going to the threshold supplier ! can be interpreted as the industrys
(i) inverse measure of market thickness in the upstream intermediate inputs market, and (ii) level of
upstream representation or the importance of the role of suppliers in partnerships, being determined
by the suppliersrelative xed costs to produce within the relationship.
Proof. This follows directly from the condition (26).
The value ! can be thought of as an initial condition that determines the industry characteristics.
It is the minimum share required by suppliers in an industry. More precisely, it is the share paid
to the threshold supplier that makes both sides break even. The derivative @!

@ks
> 0 shows that
lower xed costs encourage more suppliers to enter outsourcing relationships, thereby increasing
the thickness in the input market.9 It can be also interpreted as an industry in which suppliers
8Note that if more productive multinationals enter, their xed costs would be higher than those of a local rm so
() must be lower. As it is tougher to stay in the market, only top suppliers can manage to provide services.
9 In McLaren (2000), the thicker the market for inputs, the larger is the ex-post share of the surplus obtained by
suppliers, which in turn alleviates the hold-up ine¢ ciencies. In Grossman and Helpman (2002) instead, a thicker
market for inputs enhances the probability of nding a match, which increases the attractiveness of outsourcing.
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have a relatively higher representation or importance in outsourcing relationships (a higher relative
production xed cost) and therefore require a larger share. It will be seen that the positive surplus in
outsourcing relations with suppliers above the threshold will be divided according to the bargaining
power of each side, which does not play an important role in our results.
We can now rewrite the investment cost of the threshold supplier by substituting ! obtained in
(26) back into (24):
(; ) =
E
n
(1  )  wkf   ks: (27)
Finally, considering a specic functional form  (; ) =  for tractability, this would give a cut-o¤
technology level that just compensates for the xed production costs of both partners:10
() =

E
n (1  )  wkf   ks
: (28)
5.2 Final Good Market Entry
Equation (19) infers that there exists a threshold level of supplier capability under which they no
longer nd it worthwhile to enter a partnership. For any given level of supplier capability, the
investment cost that makes the nal producer break even can be solved in terms of (; ) and is
(; ) =
E
n
(1  )  wkf
(1  !^f ) ; (29)
where !^f is the share of the surplus paid to the supplier that satises the nal rmszero prots
condition:
!^f = 1  wkfE
n (1  )  (; )
: (30)
The supplier share that gives the nal producer zero prots is increasing with a suppliers R&D
capability and outside option, i.e., @!^f@(;) < 0 as this requires a lower transfer. This suggests that
the better a supplier is (the less investment cost it bears), the higher is the share of the surplus that
a nal producer can a¤ord to give up and still break even.
5.3 Formation of Outsourcing Relations
As in Melitz (2003), we focus on steady state equilibria. A pair of rms, the supplier in which
has the technology level , earn a joint surplus () in each period, until hit by a shock, at which
point they exit the market. A pair seeking to start operations expect a discounted value of prots
equivalent to:
v() = max
(
0;
1X
t=0
(1  )t()
)
= max

0;
1

()

;
10The important feature of  (; ) is that it is increasing in IPR enforcement and decreasing in technological
capability.
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where an anticipated negative operating prot makes the two sides exit the potential contract upon
observing . We now know there is a unique threshold  such that v() > 0 if  > .
In the industry equilibrium, we have to solve for the number of paired partners (and varieties) n,
and the distribution of the technology of suppliers that are active in the market (). We try to write
all expressions in terms of the cut-o¤ . Let us dene the weighted average supplier technological
capability measure:
~ =
Z 1
0
()d; (31)
where the conditional distribution of g() on [;1] is
() =
Z 1

()d =
g()
1 G()
from which we can rewrite (31) as
~() =
1
1 G()
Z 1

g()d; (32)
where ~ is uniquely derived by  and the exogenous distribution g() and G(). We can next dene
the average joint surplus . This can be easily calculated by using the share !^f from (30) to set
the prots of the nal producers equal to zero and solve for supplier average prots s = s(~) ks
It is also possible to do the opposite, giving the nal producer full bargaining power. By doing
so, we obtain the share !^s = wksE
n (1 ) (;)
that sets supplier prots equal to zero and solve for
f = f (~)  wkf . The derivations yield the exact same results as the two sides simply maximize
joint prots at the order contract stage.11
We start by using the ratio technique in the spirit of Melitz (2003), which gives
1(1)
2(2)
=

2
1

=) (~) =


~()

():
This allows us to calculate the average customization investment for suppliers using the investment
under the cut-o¤ technology level in (27):
 = (~) =


~()

() =


~()

E
n
(1  )  wkf   ks

(33)
The average payment, on the other hand, can be found by substituting (33) in (20) and is
T = [1  !^f ](~) = [1  !^f ]


~()

E
n
(1  )  wkf   ks

(34)
Relegating the calculations to the Appendix, we can derive the rst equation of our system,
which simplies to
 = s + T     ks =

E
n
(1  )  wkf   ks

(); (35)
11Calculations are not reported to simplify the exposition, but are available upon request.
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where
() = 1 


~()

: (36)
We can see from (35) that since a higher  increases average capability, it directly increases the
average joint surplus. There is, however, also a negative e¤ect because the capabilities of rival rms
are also increasing. The latter e¤ect tends to dominate if G() has a su¢ ciently fat right tail so that
()0 < 0, making (35) downward sloping in .12 The ex-ante probability of successful entry is
e(
)  1 G() (37)
Recall that both sides of the relationship make investments wkf and ks to enter a partnership when
they have an expectation of future positive prots. Let v represent the present value of the average
ow of the joint surplus:
v =
1


v is also the average value of rms, which is conditional upon successful entry into an outsourcing
relationship:
v =
Z 1

v()()d
The net value of entry can be dened as
ve = ev   fe =
1 G()

  fe
as Z 1
0
v()g()d =
Z 1

1

()()d =
[1 G()]

Z 1

()()d = [1 G()] 1

:
Thus, the free entry condition yields the second equation of our system
 =
fe
1 G() =
fe
e(
)
; (38)
which is increasing in .
5.4 Industry Equilibrium and IPR Enforcement
The two equations (35) and (38) together with two unknowns n and  can now be explicitly solved
to close the model. By equating the two equations obtained for , we can solve for the number
of relations (paired upstream and downstream rms), n, which is also equivalent to the number of
varieties:
n =
E (1  )
fe
e(
)() + wkf + ks
; (39)
12See Melitz (2003).
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where we have used denitions (36) and (37). It is easy to see that @n@ < 0. Replacing n from (39)
in (28) gives the zero cut-o¤ technology level in its nal form and thereby the equilibrium condition:

()e(
)
=

fe
: (40)
An increase in the RHS of (40) caused by a larger  or a lower entry cost must be accompanied by
an increase in the LHS made possible by a higher  (given that 0 < () and 0e(
) < 0) to satisfy
the equilibrium condition.
Lemma 3 The cut-o¤ technology level of suppliers is increasing with stronger IPR enforcement,
@()
@ > 0, making it less likely for less technologically capable rms, which are deprived of their
already low outside option, to lie within the range of technological capabilities governed by a contract.
Proof. This follows directly from the condition (40).
We can therefore state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 A more stringent IPR environment induces nal producers to choose suppliers that
are on average more technologically capable as outsourcing partners, i.e., ~
0
() > 0.
Proof. This follows directly from the equilibrium condition in (40) derived from (39) and (28).
Di¤erentiating average supplier capability with respect to  yields:
~
0
() =
g()(~   )
1 G() > 0:
Proposition 1 has important implications. The conventional wisdom suggests that nal produc-
ers tend to choose suppliers with better technologies to pair with. The results show that this is to
a greater extent the case in countries with better IPR institutions: the average technology of sup-
pliers is higher in countries with stronger IPR enforcement. A better legal environment reduces the
outside option of more capable suppliers, whereas that of the less capable rms is already low. This
makes suppliers with better technologies more attractive by inducing them to invest more within
the contractual relationship. On the other hand, while more capable suppliers already enjoy a large
outside option under weak IPR institutions, less capable ones are provided with a larger outside
option enabling them to also enter into outsourcing relationships.
Our nal aim is to study the impact of IPR enforcement and in turn the outsourcing decisions
by multinationals on the host economy. To do this recall that consumption of the nal good takes
place in the North. Given that a positive share of the surplus ! > 0 goes to the suppliers and is
superior to the pay-o¤ outside the relationship after exiting the market, the total prots earned from
economic activities that take place in the industry can be used to measure the industry gains in the
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Southern economy that arise from outsourcing relationships.13 To do so, we multiply Equations (38)
and (39) to obtain
n =
feE(1  )
[1 G()]

fe
e(
)() + wkf + ks
 = E(1  )
1
() +
e(
)(wkf+ks)
fe
; (41)
where we have used the denition for e(
) from (37).14 Equation (41) immediately reveals that
the impact of an upward shift in  that occurs due to strengthening IPR enforcement is ambiguous
and depends on the technology distribution. Since 0() < 0 and 0e(
) < 0, we observe two e¤ects.
The positive e¤ect is due to an increase in the prots of the remaining more technologically capable
suppliers in the intensive margin brought about by reduced competition, a lower e(
). This occurs
as a consequence of protection against the entry of more rms into the market. The negative e¤ect
appears due to lower supplier prots on the extensive margin that come from a reduced number of
active rms in the industry due to stronger rivals in the market, a lower ().15
Proposition 2 Given 0() > 0 and 0() < 0, the impact of strengthening IPR enforcement on
the host economy is twofold: reduced competition increases the average prots of the remaining more
technologically capable rms in the intensive margin, while a reduction in the absolute number of
rms on the extensive margin lowers total industry prots.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemmas 2 and 3, Equations (40) and (41), and the denition
of () in (36). That is, the derivative of (41) with respect to  is:
d(ns)
d
=
E(1  )[ 0()()2   
0
e(
)(wkf+ks)
fe
]
1
() +
e(
)(wkf+ks)
fe
2 : (42)
The e¤ect of an increase in  on aggregate industry prots depends on the sign of 
0()
()2  
0
e(
)
 7 0.
We know that 0() < 0 and 0e(
) < 0.
Proposition 2 underlines the signicance of IPR enforcement in the home economy. A more
technologically capable intermediate sector in the South brought about by better IPR enforcement
is expected to have an ambiguous impact on the home economy. More lagged economies that are
represented by a fat right tail distribution, where 0() < 0 is large and 0e(
) < 0 small, are
expected to be a¤ected negatively by an improvement in IPR institutions. In this case, losses from
facing tougher rivals assume a larger weight and the lack of su¢ cient benets in the intensive margin
makes a shrinking upstream sector decisively detrimental to the economy.
13While condition LN = wkf can be used to determine consumption in the North, labor in the South used to
produce the intermediate goods in the industry under study is equal to LS = n(x+ I+ks). This is however irrelevant
for our purpose of studying the gains from outsourcing relations in the South.
14This is equivalent to replacing the number of rms in (35) with its equilibrium value from (39) and then multiplying
the two equations.
15The negative e¤ect, however, disappears in more advanced economies with a large distribution of suppliers with
better technologies, where 0() > 0.
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Proposition 3 Given the shape of the distribution function in () and e(
), an economy where
the distribution of technology leans towards less technologically endowed suppliers is more likely to
lose from IPR enforcement. This is due to a smaller positive e¤ect of a change in  on aggregate
prots in the intensive margin and a larger negative e¤ect on the extensive margin.
Proof. This follows directly from Equation (41) and properties of the technology distribution
function in (37) and (36). Looking back at the derivative of (41) with respect to  in (42), and
recalling 0() < 0 and 0e(
) < 0, the technology distribution in the economy determines the size
of each derivative. A poor distribution of technology, i.e. a fat right tail distribution of suppliers,
implies a larger 0() < 0 and a smaller 0e(
), making it more likely for the expression to be
negative.
Proposition 3 states that IPR enforcement in technologically lagged economies is more likely to
have a negative e¤ect on the upstream supplier market given the attributes of their relationships
with downstream multinational rms. Gains from reduced competition in the intensive margin are
not su¢ cient to compensate for losses on the extensive margin brought about by the exit of less
capable suppliers. In such economies, less strict IPR enforcement generates a larger outside option
for suppliers and creates gain by allowing more suppliers to operate in the economy and benet from
links to multinational rms.
5.5 Robustness to Alternative Explanations
The results obtained from this framework are robust to several parallel studies in the international
trade and IPR literature and can be put into di¤erent contexts. To name a few we put our ndings
next to theory and evidence derived under the topic of imitation, technological complexity, and
spillovers.
In the context of imitation, it was mentioned that more capable suppliers have a larger outside
option and therefore pose a bigger threat in a contractual relationship. In a weak IPR environment,
they are not obliged to respect the rules of the contract and can use their capability to defect and
operate outside the relationship. This is parallel to imitation under a weak IPR regime, where
licensing contracts are not respected and the licensees defect and use the acquired technology for
their own purposes. Arora and Merges (2004) is among a number of papers under this branch of the
literature that show how IPR protection may encourage investments in specialized rms with strong
capabilities in the area of innovative input supply. IPRs can therefore play a role in determining
the location of rm boundaries. This is consistent with evidence by Anand and Khanna (2000) in a
study of 1,612 licensing agreements using data from the Strategic Alliance database of the Securities
Data Company.
Moving to technological complexity, Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2007) provide a theory
to show that contract enforcement stimulates the adoption of more complex technologies through
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the rmschoice of suppliers. In a similar context, by using French rm-level data Naghavi, at al.
(2014) provide evidence that rms outsource more complex technologies to countries that ensure
stronger IPR protection. Our work can also be related to this context. Here, we show that stronger
IPR enforcement shifts multinationals to form outsourcing relationships with suppliers endowed with
better technologies by reducing the probability of defection.
Spillovers are another channel through which linkages between multinationals and local suppliers
in a host country create benets for both sides. Strong linkages with such rms have been associated
with fostering production e¢ ciency, productivity growth, and technological or managerial capabil-
ities in supplier rms. Local suppliers therefore self-select into production for multinational rms.
In particular Carluccio and Fally (2013) provide a theory that sheds light on how vertical spillovers
from foreign rms can generate technology transfer and improve the productivity of upstream rms
in the domestic industry. This is in line with evidence collected in an empirical survey by Alfaro
and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) on manufacturing rms in Chile, Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil that
are distinguished by sector and ownership. Our framework can be compared to this argument as
strong IPR enforcement here also increases average technological capability in the supply chain. The
channel is however di¤erent here as this is made possible by excluding the less capable suppliers
from outsourcing relationships. In our framework, the previous ndings are made possible through
stronger IPR institutions.
6 Conclusion
This paper introduces supplier heterogeneity in the literature on rm organization in order to study
the selection mechanism through which multinationals outsource to suppliers. Doing so allows us
to study this decision under di¤erent IPR environments and highlights the impact of the latter on
the host economy. In particular, we study suppliers that are heterogeneous in terms of their ability
to make relationship-specic investments to customize the input according to standards required by
the multinationals. Suppliers of high value-added and sophisticated products and services are in
a better position to benet from such partnerships than those with simpler processes. They also
have a greater scope for exploiting their technological and organizational capabilities outside the
outsourcing contracts.
In this setting multinationals provide suppliers with assistance in raising supplierstechnological
capabilities and competitiveness to ensure that the inputs procured meet their stringent technical
requirements. The extent of the technology transfer depends on the host economy and the level
of development of local rms. Higher customization costs, less technologically endowed suppliers,
and a weak IPR regime in the host country all increase the required amount of investment by the
supplier. A multinational only o¤ers such support when the investment can be expected to yield
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a reasonable return. They are more likely to source to domestic suppliers when the technological
and managerial gaps between them and their local suppliers are not too wide to minimize training
and technology transfer costs. In other words, when potential suppliers lack the minimum base of
skills and know-how needed to absorb technologies and management practices, it becomes too costly
for multinationals to transfer technology and train suppliers to match the required international
standards. In countries with less adequate enforcement of IPRs, a higher outside option granted to
less capable suppliers enables them to also operate in the customization of inputs and supplying parts
to multinationals. Better IPR enforcement diverts attention along with the opportunity to obtain
the necessary technical assistance and know-how towards a limited number of rst-tier suppliers with
relatively better technologies. This is because a better IPR environment reduces the excessive outside
option of more technologically capable rms inducing them to invest more within the contractual
relationship.
The subsequent elimination of less capable suppliers and an enhancement of the average R&D
capability of the supply market also has numerous impacts on the host country. We nd that
better IPR enforcement has an ambiguous e¤ect on the economy. Reduced competition increases
the average prots in the industry in the intensive margin, whereas exit by less capable rms reduces
aggregate prots on the extensive margin. Strict IPR enforcement can harm economies not endowed
with a favorable distribution of technological capabilities. When a substantial mass of suppliers in
the economy are on the low technology side, better IPR enforcement reduces intensive margin gains
from lower competition, while increasing the extensive margin losses from a lower number of rms.
Our results shed light on why IPR enforcement is given more importance in technologically advanced
economies and continues to be neglected in countries such as China, which regardless enjoys an ever
increasing share of outsourcing relationships worldwide. We also hope this study can motivate the
challenging task of collecting rm-level data that contains information regarding suppliers, in order
to make possible a more in-depth analysis of outsourcing relationships between multinationals and
subcontractors of di¤erent characteristics and attributes.
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Appendix
The di¤erence between the average transfer and average investment can be solved and is
T   I =  !^f


~()

E
n
(1  )  wkf   ks

:
Average net prots can be written in terms of :
s = s + T     ks = !^f

E
n
(1  ) 


~()

E
n
(1  )  wkf   ks

  ks
=
 
1  wkf
E
n (1  )  
!
E
n
(1  ) 


~()

E
n
(1  )  wkf   ks

  ks
=
0@1  wkf
E
n (1  ) 


~()
 
E
n (1  )  wkf   ks

1A


E
n
(1  ) 


~()

E
n
(1  )  wkf   ks

  ks
=
E
n
(1  ) 


~()

E
n
(1  )  wkf   ks

  wkf   ks
where we have substituted for !^f from (30) and for  from (33).
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